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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the stunning growth of international trade in the last half century, the
distinction between public international law and private international law has
become increasingly blurred. Private international concerns exert greater influence over decisions made in the international public sphere, and the policies and
actions of governments and international organizations significantly affect domestic and transnational private parties. On a practical level, then, the interests
and undertakings of national governments, international organizations, and private actors are more interdependent than ever before.
The effect of this definitional blurring is of particular importance in the
area of state and government succession. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, the world has experienced a spate of state and government successions in
various forms, and more are possible in the near future. Moreover, while international law doctrine concerning state and government succession has long been
the subject of energetic debate,1 post–Cold War succession events have underscored even more clearly that international law doctrine on state and government
succession does not reflect state practice.2 When doctrine does not reflect practice
— when there are as many (or more) exceptions to a rule as instances of following
it — the time is ripe for a complete rethinking of that doctrine. Continuing to fit
factual square pegs into doctrinal round holes is not only unedifying, but also a
hindrance to meaningful analysis.3
Such a reconceptualization of state and government succession doctrine is
precisely what Professor Tai-Heng Cheng’s book, State Succession and Commercial Obligations, seeks to accomplish. The book is an ambitious work that
cogently addresses the long-problematic subject of state and government succession. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Professor Cheng’s approach to this challenging
task is based on a startlingly straightforward proposition: that the current discon1.

See , e.g., WILLIAM HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Pearce Higgins ed., William S.
Hein & Co. 2001) (1884); ARTHUR KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENGLISH AND COLONIAL LAW (1907); YILMA MAKONNEN, THE NYERERE DOCTRINE OF
STATE SUCCESSION AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA (1984); DANIEL O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION
IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 379 (2002); Ana
Staniè, Financial Aspects of State Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR . J. INT’L L. 751
(2001); Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts & Assets: The Modern Law and
Policy, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 355 (2001). For further discussion, see TAI-HENG CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS 13–26 (2006).

2.

Current doctrine on these subjects is largely set forth in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf [hereinafter 1978 Vienna Convention], which entered
into force in 1996, and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, Apr. 8, 1983, 25 I.L.M. 1640 (1986), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/3_3_1983.pdf [hereinafter 1983 Vienna Convention], which has yet to
enter into force but is reflective of current doctrine [Collectively hereinafter Vienna Conventions].

3.

It is also worth noting that, at least in this reviewer’s personal experience, this sort of disconnect between
doctrine and facts becomes especially apparent in the law school classroom, as students often struggle with
distinctions that perhaps make theoretical sense but prove difficult in application.
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nect between succession doctrine and practice is largely due to the effects of globalization, and that the nature of globalization provides an answer to the problem.
The first sentence of his book, in fact, sweepingly asserts that “[t]he story of state
succession and commercial obligations is a story about globalization.”4 One might
even go so far as to divide his book into two basic parts — the first part being the
opening sentence, and the second part being the 408 pages needed to unpack this
statement’s meaning.
Thinking about Professor Cheng’s book in this manner actually helps highlight one of the text’s greatest strengths: that it discusses the subject of state and
government succession from a variety of detail-specific angles without losing
sight of the enormously broad and complex picture of globalization, with its various factual permutations. Or perhaps to state it differently, the book maintains a
strong thematic focus while also exploring in detail the evolution of current doctrine and the playing out of recent succession events.5 Moreover, Professor
Cheng seeks not only to recommend a new legal approach to state and government succession that is more consistent with actual practice, but also to mesh this
approach, to the extent possible, with existing doctrine and to identify themes in
current doctrine that are consistent with his recommendations. This is a difficult
task, and accomplishing it well is a hallmark of the book. This “forest and the
trees” quality is in fact consistent with Professor Cheng’s previous scholarship,6
and it helps make State Succession and Commercial Obligations a thoughtful
and clearly written volume that contributes significantly to the academic literature on state and government succession.
This book review will first provide a summary and analysis of key principles and observations discussed in the book. The review will then analyze Professor Cheng’s reconceptualization of state and government succession from two
perspectives not explored in the text — namely, economic theory concerning the
identification and allocation of rights, and virtual state theory, with its emphasis
on commercial and financial concerns as bases for state power. While having a
discussion along these lines in the book would have proved interesting, its absence
is best viewed not as a shortcoming, but rather as an invitation for further inquiry. Professor Cheng’s approach to state succession stands up well from these
other theoretical vantage points, which demonstrates the book’s usefulness as a
framework for further scholarship on this historically problematic and fundamentally important area of international law. Playing off that point, this review
will close with comments regarding how Professor Cheng’s reconceptualization
4.

CHENG, supra note 1, at 3.

5.

The succession events included in the book as case studies are East Timor, Hong Kong and Macau, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. See id. at 171–375.

6.

See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
465 (2005); Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to Human Rights, 13 P AC. RIM L. &
P OL’Y J. 257 (2004).

583

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-3\NLR304.txt

unknown

Seq: 6

26-APR-07

14:25

SEEING THE FOREST AND THE TREES

might be applied to the 2003 invasion and subsequent reconstruction of Iraq, as
well as other future succession events.
II.

RECONCEPTUALIZING STATE SUCCESSION

A.

Key Concepts

In exploring the implications of globalization for state and government successions, Professor Cheng crafts a compelling argument for his reconceptualization of international law on the subject. Two key points frame his analysis.
First, Professor Cheng observes that the growing density of international commercial relationships and obligations means that state and government successions, and their concomitant effects on existing commercial obligations of and
relating to the states in question, have a far broader impact than in previous
eras.7 Second, he adopts a broad conception of “state succession.” Traditional
distinctions made between state succession and government succession — with
the standard, stark contrast between universal succession (with state obligations
generally passing in their entirety) and the clean slate doctrine (with obligations
not passing unless expressly adopted) — are eschewed in favor of treating government succession as a subset of state succession. State succession is thus inclusively defined by Professor Cheng to mean “all changes to fundamental structures
of internal governance that trigger international demands to adjust commercial
obligations and require international responses.”8
This approach is, as Professor Cheng notes, a “policy-oriented” approach to
state succession, in contrast to previous approaches based on territorial changes or
changes in the legal personality of a state. Professor Cheng’s approach would
cover three general forms of state succession (as broadly defined in the book).
First, it would include consensual and non-consensual territorial relocations or
changes, such as the transfer of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the
People’s Republic of China. Second, it would cover breaks or changes in governmental power and control over a territory (e.g., decolonization, dissolution, etc.),
such as the establishment of an independent government for East Timor. Third,
it would include any fundamental changes in government structure that had significant effect on the state’s international commercial obligations (such as repudiations or modifications), but which did not change the territory of the state
involved. The latter would include, for example, Myanmar’s (Burma) change
7.

See , e.g., CHENG, supra note 1, at 3, 8–9, 382.

8.

Id. at 38. It should be noted that there have been previous proponents of inclusiveness in defining and
establishing international law and policy concerning state (and government) succession, in particular during the drafting of and discussion of the 1978 Vienna Convention and the 1983 Vienna Convention.
Vienna Conventions, supra note 2. As Professor Cheng points out, however, these conventions ultimately
incorporated and reflected narrower conceptions of succession — such as excluding indirect commercial
effects — and perpetuated the distinction between state and government succession. See CHENG, supra
note 1, at 79–81, 123–24.
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from democratic governance to military dictatorship.9 It is this last category that
is perhaps most interesting, since not only does it illustrate Professor Cheng’s
broad, inclusive approach of viewing government succession as a subset of state
succession, but it also brings events such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq into the fold
for discussion as a state succession event with significant legal implications.
The justifications offered for this approach are that the commercial and political effects flowing from state and government successions are largely the same;
that in practice little or no real distinction is made between the different types of
succession when deciding what commercial obligations continue, are modified, or
are terminated; and that such artificial doctrinal distinctions do little to promote
global order and commercial stability.10 Professor Cheng particularly observes
that recent state succession events have been characterized by pragmatic adjustments to existing commercial obligations, rather than any pattern of adherence to
doctrinal categories in deciding which commercial obligations are terminated and
which ones continue.11 To put the point concisely, traditional doctrine, when
viewed against the backdrop of actual state practice, embodies a distinction without much ultimate difference.12 Professor Cheng’s broad definition of state succession will be used for the remainder of this review to refer to both state and
government succession.
Similarly, “commercial obligations” affected by state succession and “participants” in the process of state succession are also broadly defined to include not only
financial debt obligations, but also international commercial obligations, both
public and private, that can be interrupted by the process of state succession.13
Again, this goes back to the first sentence of the book: Narrow or outdated definitions fail to capture the full scope or impact of state successions on global commerce and financial obligations, and thus are of limited or no use in
understanding state successions or setting relevant policy.
B.

Continuity of Cooperation

With these observations in mind, one of Professor Cheng’s primary theses is
that with growing international interdependency, public and private parties
with commercial interests affected by state successions often work cooperatively to
maximize the continuation of commercial obligations to their collective benefit.
Negotiations or discussions amongst the parties (which presumably can take a
variety of forms, such as government negotiations, summits, sidebar meetings,
and so on) may lead to the continuation of beneficial or mutually advantageous
9.

CHENG, supra note 1, at 51.

10. Id. at 4–5, 26–27.
11. Id. at 171–374.
12. This, of course, was not the view of many who drafted and debated the 1978 Vienna Convention and the

1983 Vienna Convention. Vienna Conventions, supra note 2; see CHENG, supra note 1, at 79–168.
13. CHENG, supra note 1, at 37, 53–54, 65.

585

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-3\NLR304.txt

unknown

Seq: 8

26-APR-07

14:25

SEEING THE FOREST AND THE TREES

state obligations and the termination of non-beneficial ones.14 Contrary to the
traditional view of continuation-versus-termination of obligations as a zero-sum
game (in which commercial obligations were generally more narrowly defined as
state debt and financial obligations), taking a broader view of the parties involved and of obligations affected by state succession suggests that the balance
generally weighs in favor of maintaining overall continuity of many obligations.15 While specific, individual obligations may or may not be continued —
and recognizing that some state succession events unfortunately may not be characterized by cooperation — Professor Cheng argues that from a macro-perspective, global interdependency encourages what he calls the overall “continuity of
cooperation.” This means that the various parties involved in and affected by a
state succession event typically seek to reach general, cooperative consensus on
post-succession commercial obligations, which helps facilitate peaceful and orderly
state succession and a net gain in ongoing obligations and commercial activity.16
In exploring the broad consequences of state successions and the importance
of cooperation and continuity, Professor Cheng identifies three categories of impact: geopolitical impact, such as on global and regional balances of power; financial impact, such as through foreign investments by U.S. banks; and
commercial impact, meaning the web of international trade in goods, services,
and capital that may be affected by a state succession event.17 In this respect, the
book again exhibits attention to detail (in its appreciation that the effects of succession can take many forms), while maintaining a broader, meta-theoretical
view of the full implications and interaction of these factors. The book’s common
theme in this regard is that because of the “dense global fabric” of commercial and
political relations, the repudiation or acceptance of prior obligations in a state
succession event will exert a ripple effect on the global community.18 For example, the repudiation of a particular state debt owed to another state affects not
only the states directly involved, but also can impinge on existing commercial and
financial relationships (or discourage future ones) between the repudiating state
and private parties, who may see the repudiation as evidence of instability or
unwillingness to honor existing or future agreements. The loss of such opportunities thus may cause an adverse, indirect effect on these private parties’ ability to
enter into agreements or arrangements with other third parties (e.g., due to reduced profits), and this in turn can affect the third parties’ business opportunities,
and so on. In other words, cooperation can be a positive-sum game, and noncooperation — the repudiation of beneficial agreements and obligations — can be
14. Id. at 5, 65–71.
15. Id. at 65.
16. Id. at 34.
17. Id. at 8–13.
18. Id. at 8.
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a negative-sum game. Although not stated as such in the book, the result is akin
to the multiplier effect concept commonly used to describe the positive (or negative) effect of marginal increases (or reductions) in discretionary spending on
overall economic growth.19
Due to the importance of continuity and the broad impact of state succession
events, Professor Cheng further suggests that because some affected parties (such
as corporations) may not be at the succession negotiating table, the international
law of state succession should take into consideration the interests not only of the
decision-makers in a succession event, but also the other parties who are directly
or indirectly affected by the succession but are unable to directly protect their
interests.20 Failure to do so would overlook important aspects of continuity in a
given succession event, which would result in reduced overall benefits to the parties affected and to the overall global system.
C.

Case Studies and Policy Appraisal

State Succession and Commercial Obligations seeks not only to accurately describe state succession events, but also to provide a heuristic definition of
state succession with analytical or predictive use.21 Part II of the book thus reviews the evolution of the current international law of succession through the
lenses of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978 22 and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983.23 Part III builds on this
by discussing recent succession events involving East Timor, Hong Kong and
Macau, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. These parts of the book
also provide a preliminary appraisal of existing, evolving, and recommended policy for state succession.
For example, with respect to the transfers of British-controlled Hong Kong
and Portuguese-controlled Macau to the People’s Republic of China, Professor
Cheng observes that direct and indirect participants in the process experienced
few or no inequitable outcomes, in large part because the interests of parties involved or affected converged. Such a successful and largely seamless transfer suggests what factors might facilitate and promote continuity in future succession
events.24 Similarly, with respect to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Professor
Cheng points to efforts to maintain existing commercial arrangements via treaties, the exchange of notes, and other instruments as positive developments, and
19. See , e.g., TONY CLEAVER, UNDERSTANDING

THE WORLD

ECONOMY 62 (2002).

20. CHENG, supra note 1, at 71.
21. Id. at 46–50 (critiquing various personal approaches to state succession).
22. 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at 3.
23. 1983 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at 1640.
24. CHENG, supra note 1, at 209, 233–34.
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to difficulties in enforcing such agreements in domestic courts (which might terminate preexisting agreements on the basis of domestic law) as evidence of a need
to modify and strengthen international law to support state succession based on
the principle of overall continuity of cooperation.25
With these case studies in mind, State Succession and Commercial Obligations offers a framework for analyzing succession events that policy makers,
private parties, and lawyers can use to assess particular succession events and the
range of outcomes that might be expected. Professor Cheng is careful not to overreach or over-generalize in his conclusions: He acknowledges, for example, that a
new set of comprehensive succession rules is not likely to emerge in the near future.26 Instead, he suggests five “conditioning factors” to be used to examine state
succession events, assess possible outcomes, and craft strategies for seeking the desirable continuation (or termination) of commercial obligations affected by state
succession. The five factors proposed by Professor Cheng are the density of international relationships; the relative power and authority of decision-makers,
which might lead to outcomes biased toward the interests or goals of certain actors; human rights considerations that might weigh in favor of discontinuity of
certain obligations to eliminate oppression of certain populations; geopolitical factors that may overshadow commercial concerns; and the tendency for many decisions in succession events to be made on a collective basis — which sometimes
means that certain parties collectively agree to an outcome but exclude other affected parties from the decision-making process.27
These conditioning factors are useful, and Professor Cheng’s broad, inclusive
approach does provide for accurate description of state succession and appears
promising as a predictor, at least on a general level, of outcomes in future state
succession events. Yet he also offers some suggested changes to the international
law of state succession that would further promote cooperation and continuity,
especially in situations where cooperation and continuity might be overcome by
other concerns. In his words, “[t]he next frontier for the law of state succession is
to strengthen the policy of discouraging and correcting errant behavior” in succession events.28 Professor Cheng thus recommends the development of stronger
means to discourage unjustified successions and to minimize the impact of unjustified successions on commercial obligations. Whether this is accomplished
through the creation of a new international adjudicatory body, the hearing of
such disputes by an existing body, or even in some cases by encouraging adjudication by national courts, this goal can be at least partially achieved by supporting
some sort of “final dispute resolution” in contested succession events.29
25. Id. at 374–75.
26. Id. at 379.
27. Id. at 382–99.
28. Id. at 403.
29. Id. at 401–02.
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ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES

State Succession and Commercial Obligations is a thought-provoking
piece of work that holds the promise of spurring additional scholarly inquiry into
the international law of state succession. In reading the book, one finds it difficult not to think about how different areas of scholarship or schools of thought
apply to the subject and either support the book’s arguments or raise questions
worth further inquiry. Two brief examples of this are discussed below.
A.

The Coase Theorem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Professor Cheng posits in the book that current state succession doctrine —
with its artificial distinction between state and government successions, and with
its sometimes stark contrast between universal succession and the clean slate doctrine — is harmful not only because these distinctions do not reflect practice, but
also because the doctrine seeks to establish clear and unambiguous rules in an area
where such allocations of rights are not beneficial. Specifically, he notes that “international law should influence the substantive adjustments to commercial arrangements that are reached by consensus among decision makers in successions.
This policy . . . rejects the binary choice between continuity or discontinuity of all
obligations . . . [and] favors a contextual approach.”30
This is an extremely interesting statement. Is it an assertion that not clearly
allocating rights in a succession event — in this case, the right to continuity of
obligations versus discontinuity or the right to terminate — is efficient? Whether
or not this is the case, it is a question worth exploring further. The Coase Theorem posits that “bargainers” — which parties to state succession certainly are —
“are more likely to cooperate when their rights are clear and less likely to agree
when their rights are ambiguous . . . .”31 The possible application of this theorem
in the international law arena was in fact discussed in another recent book on the
sharing of transboundary resources, and the theorem also might translate well to
a discussion of commercial rights and obligations in the state succession context.32
Thus, we might ask whether Professor Cheng’s position, which sounds reasonable, is consistent with Professor Coase’s famous theorem. That is, do Professor Cheng’s conclusions jibe with the Coase Theorem because transaction costs in
state succession events are generally too high due to the large number of potential
bargainers and interests involved? Language in the book suggests this conclusion
— namely, statements characterizing commercial arrangements amongst parties

30. Id. at 31–32.
31. R OBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (3d ed. 2000).
32. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 161–68 (2002) (discussing vague international law standards in general and the international law principle of equitable and rational use in particular); see also Daniel Bodansky, Recent Book
on International Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (2005) (reviewing id.).
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to state succession as “overlapping,” and statements noting that the “costs of dismantling and recreating these commercial arrangements” would be high.33
Alternatively, is the problem perhaps due to an insufficient or unfeasible
allocation of property rights — meaning that it is often not apparent who has
what rights, given that it is frequently unclear whether a succession event is one
of state succession or government succession? Professor Cheng implies this may
not be the problem in all cases (although it certainly is in some): In the context of
a regime change, he suggests that a bright-line rule regarding state obligations
after regime change is problematic not because it is not clear, but rather because it
“may cause disorder if the predecessor government’s obligations no longer serve
the needs of the international community and prevent the swift reintegration of
the successor government into the international community.”34
With this in mind, then, is it more accurate to say that regardless of the
Coase Theorem, as a policy matter Professor Cheng is arguing that less defined
rights and obligations are desirable, since in the absence of clear rights parties
will be more cooperative? Or might we posit that ambiguously defined rights
and obligations would discourage distributive payments, such as from developed
countries or large international companies to a developing country? Such payments might smack of payoffs, i.e., payments might be necessary to prevent (or
achieve) cancellation of obligations — an efficient result, but perhaps a politically
undesirable one.35 The possibility exists that certain parties might hold out in the
hope of higher payoffs (much like the last property owner in the way of a new
development gets a higher price). From that perspective, ambiguous assignment
of post-succession rights might help forestall this — or would it replace it with
overt power politics?
Finally, might this subject be more appropriately viewed as a prisoner’s dilemma? Might a lack of clear post-succession rights encourage cooperation to the
general benefit of all, whereas clearly delineated rules might encourage gaming
behavior in pursuit of individual gain, and therefore lead to overall suboptimal
outcomes? Or might the opposite be true, such as if the parties involved suffer
from optimism bias and fail to appreciate the negative outcome of noncooperation?
These questions are certainly worth further discussion and exploration.
Professor Cheng’s positions are well reasoned and compelling, and it must be said
that despite decades of effort, international commentators have not come up with
33. CHENG, supra note 1, at 384.
34. Id. at 49.
35. In this regard, it is interesting to note, as Professor Cheng does, that the clean slate rule was largely

intended to provide newly independent colonies with a favorable position regarding their obligations
going forward, but in many cases these newly independent states chose voluntarily to assume prior debts
and obligations. See id. at 105–06; OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–30 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 1992).
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a viable system for clearly assigning rights in state succession events. So perhaps
Professor Cheng has it right. Nonetheless, these questions invite further inquiry,
and State Succession and Commercial Obligations helps bring these issues
into starker relief and provides a useful framework for further analysis.
B.

Virtual States and International Law

In the past decade or so there have been several works from the field of
political science that might be best characterized as research on the subject of the
“virtual state.” In The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the
Coming Century, Professor Richard Rosecrance boldly asserts that “developed
states are putting aside military and territorial ambitions as they struggle not for
political dominance but for a greater share of world output,” and he concludes
that “[t]he nation-state is becoming a tighter, more vigorous unit capable of sustaining the pressures of worldwide competition.”36 In other words, Professor
Rosecrance asserts that GDP has become a primary indicator of national power.
Other commentators have discussed the identity of states in light of increased
interdependence and growth in electronic communications and the Internet.37
It is far beyond the scope of this book review to discuss the metaphysics of the
nation-state, or whether those predicting its demise assert too much, as they likely
do.38 It useful to note, however, that viewing states as a nexus of commercial
interests fits nicely with Professor Cheng’s view of state succession as largely being driven by efforts of states and private actors to protect overall commercial
interests. When a state undergoes a radical transformation in the form of state
succession, then, a primary concern of all, including the state, is to ensure the
continuity of the commercial interests that are indicia of power. It is in other
words a positive-sum game, and cooperation and continuity tend to protect and
enhance the very economic activity that virtual state theorists suggest states
would indeed want to protect. Moreover, drawing distinctions based on the type
of state succession event adds little or no richness to the analysis, since at the end
of the day what matters is the commercial interest, not the form of the event
through which it is continued or repudiated.

36. R ICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE

OF THE

VIRTUAL STATE: WEALTH

AND

POWER

IN THE

COMING

CENTURY 3 (1999).
37. See , e.g., J ERRY EVERARD, VIRTUAL STATES: THE INTERNET

AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NATIONSTATE (2000); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002);
Cristoph Engel, The Internet and the Nation State, in UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL
NETWORKS ON LOCAL SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL VALUES 201 (Cristoph Engel & K.H. Keller
eds., Patricia Adler trans., 2000), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/9907.pdf; James Child,
Terrorism, the Internet and the Decline of the Nation-State (Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://www.bgsu.edu/departments/phil/faculty/child/globalizationpaper.pdf#search=%22terrorism%
20internet%20decline%20nation-state%22.

38. For discussion of these issues see EVERARD, supra note 37, at 3–9.
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CONCLUSION: FUTURE APPLICATIONS

All in all, State Succession and Commercial Obligations is an admirable
book. Professor Cheng recognizes the ambiguities and complexities of his subject,
and he successfully crafts an approach to state succession that is promising both as
a descriptor and a predictor of state succession events. That is no mean feat.
While one might wish for more specific or particularized conclusions than the
generalized observations and conditioning factors presented in the book, such abstraction is unavoidable — and in a way it is a virtue, since his approach recognizes the breadth and nuance of globalization’s multifaceted impact on state
successions. Instead of trying to shoe-horn this rich subject into a specific theoretical model or set of recommendations, the book acknowledges and accepts the complicated nature of this subject for what it is.
The next decade or so likely will provide fertile ground for assessing the
utility of Professor Cheng’s reconceptualization of state succession. How well, for
example, does his approach hold up in the context of the 2003 regime change in
Iraq? Events thus far indicate that heavy emphasis has been placed on the adjustment of obligations undertaken by the previous Iraqi government, with the
intended aim being the cancellation of substantial portions of Iraq’s debt in order
to facilitate the emergence of a stable Iraqi regime that is beneficial to the international community.39 In other words, the process of assuming and repudiating
commercial obligations in post-invasion Iraq seems to be largely consistent with
Professor Cheng’s reconceptualization of state succession. Multiple parties have
significant interests in the future of post-invasion Iraq — including its creditors,
the United States (largely from a geopolitical perspective), neighboring states,
and private parties wanting to do business with the new government. The relative weight of these interests will help shape the final structure of the new Iraqi
government’s ongoing commercial obligations. Further study of Iraq as an example of state succession is thus certainly warranted — and, in fact, some of Professor Cheng’s current scholarship focuses on Iraq and the restructuring of its debt
load.40

39. See , e.g., MARTIN A. WEISS, CRS REPORT

FOR CONGRESS, IRAQ: DEBT RELIEF 1–5 (2005), http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21765.pdf#search=%22paris%20club%20iraq%20debt%22; Bush Hails
Paris Club Decision to Reduce Iraqi Debt, Portaliraq (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.portaliraq.com/news/
Bushǎils+Paris+Clubdecisiontoreduce+Iraqidebt__644.html?PHPSESSID=8ec6e42702c
086ebf01a860ca8f4; Denmark Cancels 80 Percent of its Iraqi Debt, Portaliraq (Dec. 28, 2005), http://
www.portaliraq.com/news/Denmarkcancels+80percent+ofţs+Iraqidebt__1111726.html?PHPSESSID
=8ec6e42702c086ebf01a860ca8f4; Iraq Announces Results of Commercial Debt Settlement, Portaliraq
(Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.portaliraq.com/news/Iraq+announcesresults+ofcommercialdebtsettlement__
1111902.html.

40. Tai-Heng Cheng, What’s Wrong with the Odious Debt Doctrine and How to Fix It, LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
948704.
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In addition to Iraq, there may be other succession events in store for the near
future. What sort of continuity of cooperation might we expect in the event of a
regime change or other type of succession event in North Korea? Or Iran? Or
Chechnya? Or in other countries or regions in which there is the possibility of
events such as regional independence or significant changes in government? It
would be enormously interesting to see Professor Cheng’s approach employed to
predict likely outcomes regarding commercial obligations prior to such secession
events, and then to compare this predictive work against actual results as they
unfold. In this sense too, State Succession and Commercial Obligations is
both a welcome contribution to the academic literature on state succession and an
invitation for further inquiry.
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